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1. Introduction 
Between 1993 and 2000, South Africa experienced an increase in the poverty headcount 
accompanied by a sharp decrease in average life expectancy and a growing proportion of 
undernourished children. Similar trends were observed in Ivory Coast, Moldova, Belarus, and 
Burundi, just to mention a few countries. Over the same period of time, countries like 
Lithuania, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Gambia achieved a significant reduction in monetary 
poverty, longer life expectancy, higher rates of immunisation, and lower rates of child 
mortality and undernourishment. This large variety of development experiences raises a 
simple, albeit crucial, question: to what extent can economic policies help create favourable 
conditions for faster development?  
 
In this paper we attempt to provide an answer to this question by exploiting an interesting 
feature of the development data. We observe that the dynamics of several development 
indicators can be grouped into four clusters, each cluster corresponding to a different 
combination of growth and changes in inequality. In this way, we can identify four scenarios 
of development. We then use an ordered probit model to study how structural and policy 
factors affect the probability of a country ending-up in the most (or least) favourable of these 
four scenarios. As discussed in more detail below, this approach has a couple of important 
advantages. First, given that the scenarios account for the different dynamics of several 
development indicators (and not just one indicator), our approach allows us to study the 
conditions for broad development. That is, we look at development in its multidimensionality 
and not just at how policies can help improve one specific development indicator. Moreover, 
we can do this without having to construct an arbitrary aggregate measure of development. 
Second, with the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using 
growth and inequality as continuous dependent variables in a single or system equation 
estimation. These advantages come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the 
categorical dependent variable in our model turns out to be a very strong predictor of 
development outcomes, possibly even stronger than the continuous measures of growth and 
inequality.  
 
Our main results can be summarised as follows. The probability of a country being in 
scenarios that are most favourable to development increases the higher the growth rate of 
agricultural productivity, the more rapid the accumulation of human capital, the faster the 
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structural transformation of the productive system, and the more widespread access to 
infrastructures is. We also find some important structural effects linked to a country’s legal 
origin and geographical position. Finally, we provide evidence of the importance of initial 
conditions: economies at earlier stages of economic development and initially characterised 
by wider inequalities are more likely to end up in a scenario that is more favourable to 
development. Taken together, these results highlight what we believe is an important story: 
countries are not destined by nature or colonial heritage to remain trapped into 
underdevelopment. “Good” policies exist that can help countries achieve scenarios that are 
most conducive to a rapid improvement of development indicators. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set our paper in the context of 
the existing literature. In section 3 we define and characterise the four scenarios that 
constitute the object of our study. Section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5 
provides a summary and conclusion. An appendix with detailed material, including data 
construction and sources, additional econometric results, and sensitivity analysis is made 
available separately.   
 
2. This paper in the context of the literature 
 
This paper relates to the vast literature on the empirical determinants of development 
outcomes which consists of several strands. There is of course a well established line of 
research that uses per-capita GDP as a proxy for development, thus estimating regression 
models in the level of income. Notable examples of this approach include, inter alia, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Sachs (2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), Cartensen and Gundlach (2006), 
Nunn (2008), Bhattacharyya (2009), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009). A second avenue of 
research estimates single equation regressions of specific development indicators, such as,  
the poverty headcount (see, among others, Bourguignon, 2003; Chhibber and Nayyar, 2008; 
Loayza and Raddatz, 2008; and Ravaillon and Datt, 2002); mortality, life expectancy, or 
some other health indicator (see Powles, 2001; Deaton, 2003; and Cutler, 2006)1
 
; school 
enrolment rates, literacy rates, or related measures of educational attainments (see, inter alia 
Carmignani, 2008; Flug et al., 1998; Gupta et al. 2002). 
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Even though there is likely to be a positive correlation between different development 
dimensions, disaggregate indicators such as those mentioned above are not representative of 
development in its multidimensionality. For this reason, a third strand of empirical analysis, 
more recent and certainly less voluminous than the previous two, makes use of some 
aggregate measure of development as the dependent variable in the regression model. This 
practice is indeed facilitated by the availability of a well-known index of human development 
(HDI). This index is prepared by the United Nations Development Programme exactly with 
the scope to condense different components of a broad notion of development into a single 
indicator. While not immune from criticisms, especially with respect to the weighting system 
used to aggregate the individual components, the HDI has been used in academic research 
(see,  for instance, Zgheib et al. (2006) and Constantini and Monni (2008)). An alternative is 
suggested by Avom and Carmignani (2008) who aggregate different indicators of health and 
education by means of principal components.  
 
In this paper we take a different methodological route to the analysis of the determinants of 
development. Instead of measuring development directly, we identify the scenarios that lead 
to development (or underdevelopment) and then study the probability of a country ending-up 
in anyone of these scenarios. The scenarios arise from the combination of growth and 
changes in inequality. We therefore have: (i) scenario one: positive growth and decreasing 
inequality, (ii) scenario two: positive growth and increasing inequality, (iii) scenario three: 
negative growth and decreasing inequality, and (iv) scenario four: negative growth and 
increasing inequality. These scenarios correspond to systematically different dynamics of 
several development indicators so that, in fact, they are naturally ordered from most 
conducive to development (scenario one) to least conducive to development (scenario four). 
Once the scenarios are defined, an ordered probit model will be used to see how different 
structural and policy factors affect the probability of a country achieving the most favourable 
(or the least favourable) scenario. To this purpose, we construct a categorical variable that 
takes values 0, 1, 2, and 3 (the variable equals 0 for observations falling in scenario one, 
value 1 for observations falling in scenario two and so on). In this way, we can adopt a rich 
specification of the right hand side variables while accounting for the simultaneous 
evolvement of growth and inequality. Methodologically, our paper is therefore nested within 
the class of models with limited dependent variables that have been analysed in Maddala 
(1983). 
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There are important advantages in pursuing this approach. First,  we are able to study the 
determinants of broad development rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or 
indicator. The ordering of scenarios from most favourable to least favourable holds for 
several different development measures, including the poverty headcount, child mortality, life 
expectancy, malnutrition, immunisation, and female literacy. Therefore, we are not just 
running, say, a poverty regression. Instead, by studying what affects the probability of a 
country achieving the most favourable scenario, we are in fact studying how policy and 
structural factors contribute to the creation of conditions that are conducive to development in 
its multiple forms. Equally important is the fact that we are able to do this without having to 
aggregate different indicators into a single synthetic measure. We therefore avoid the 
complications and arbitrary choices associated with the design of a weighting system that 
instead plague the construction of the HDI.  
 
A second advantage of our approach is that it does not require us to model growth and 
inequality separately. As pointed out in Lundberg and Squire (2003),  single equation 
estimation of growth and inequality is problematic given that the two processes are jointly 
endogenous. In this context, system estimation offers a superior alternative by modelling 
growth and inequality as the joint outcomes of other variables. But system estimation is not 
immune from pitfalls. In fact, the estimation of structural parameters in a system of 
endogenous equations requires exclusion restrictions (see Huang et al. 2009). However, 
finding theoretically justifiable and meaningful exclusion restrictions is a hard task. 
Furthermore, if one equation in the system is misspecified, then the estimates of the other 
equations in the system will also be contaminated. In this sense, estimates from 3SLS, or 
even SURE, often turn out to be very sensitive to the choice of regressors and identifying 
restrictions. Finally, when the equations in the system are simultaneously endogenous, 
multicollinearity between any of the endogenous dependent variables and the other regressors 
can significantly reduce the precision of coefficient estimates. To deal with these problems, 
one might want to adopt parsimonious specifications of the two equations, but this in turn 
increases the risk of misspecification. With our approach, instead, we are able to estimate a 
rich specification of the right hand side variables while accounting for the simultaneous 
evolvement of growth and inequality. 
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Using a categorical variable when continuous variables (in this case growth and changes in 
inequality) are available might involve a cost in terms of loss of information. However, we 
argue that this cost, in the specific case of our dataset, is not large. We provide three bits of 
evidence to support our statement. First, we estimate a standard system of two equations with 
growth and inequality as dependent variables (appendix, section A1). While the sign of the 
estimated coefficients from the system is generally coherent with the sign of the estimated 
coefficients from the ordered probit model, the standard errors tend to be larger in the system. 
In other words, the ordered probit model seems to yield more precise estimates. Second, we 
show that our categorical variable has a very strong and significant association with 
development outcomes. To this purpose, we regress development indicators on the 
categorical variable (appendix, section A2). The estimated coefficient of the categorical 
variable is always statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and the goodness of fit of the 
regression ranges between 0.3 and 0.4. A regression of the same development indicators on 
growth and changes in inequality yields similar goodness of fit, with estimated coefficients 
that occasionally fail to be significant at the 1 per cent. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
categorical variable remains highly significant even when growth and inequality are added to 
the regression. Third, as documented in the next section, variation across scenarios explains a 
large proportion of total variation in development indicators, growth, and changes in 
inequality. This means that explaining why some countries are able to achieve scenario one 
while others are not goes a long way towards explaining why some countries develop and 
others do not.  
  
3. Scenarios of development 
 
Our dataset consist of a sample of 145 observations covering 71 developing countries. Each 
observation is taken over sub-periods of at least five years. For each variable, we measure its 
level at the beginning of the relevant sub-period (e.g. the “initial” value) and its annualised 
rate of change over the entire sub-period.2
 
 
For any given country c and sub-period t, let yi,t denote the change in per-capita GDP and gc,t 
the change in the Gini coefficient. We partition the sample along these two dimensions 
according to the following rule: 
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- scenario one: yc,t > 0 and gc,t < 0 (positive growth with decreasing inequality) 
- scenario two: yc,t > 0 and gc,t > 0 (positive growth with increasing inequality) 
- scenario three: yc,t < 0 and gc,t < 0 (negative growth with decreasing inequality) 
- scenario four: yc,t < 0 and gc,t < 0 (negative growth with increasing inequality) 
 
In the full sample of all 145 observations, there are 55 observations that fall in scenario one, 
54 in scenario two, 15 in scenario three, and 21 in scenario four. 
 
That a combination of positive growth and decreasing inequality is the best possible scenario 
for the reduction of the poverty headcount is a well known result from the poverty literature 
(see, for instance, Bourguignon, 2003). In the rest of this section we provide evidence that the 
ordering from most favourable (scenario one) to least favourable (scenario four) holds for 
various other dimensions of development. 
 
We consider five development indicators in addition to the poverty headcount: child 
mortality, life expectancy, child immunisation against DPT, child malnutrition, and female 
literacy. The average rate of change of these indicators in the four scenarios is shown in table 
1. The table also shows the average rate of growth and change in inequality in each scenario. 
In the last column we report the standard deviation of rates of change between scenarios in 
per cent of the standard deviation of rates of change in the full sample. This latter statistic is 
therefore useful to assess how important variation between scenarios is relative to variation 
within scenarios.   
 
SEE TABLE 1 (appendix) 
 
The data in the table confirm that the four scenarios are clearly ordered. Scenario one is most 
conducive to development, followed by scenarios two,  three, and  four, respectively. 
Scenario four is the least conducive to development. The differences between scenarios are 
generally large and statistically significant. In fact, for each indicator, we estimated a 
regression of its rate of change in scenario j on a constant and dummies for the other 
scenarios. The estimated coefficients from these regressions are equal to the difference in the 
rate of change between scenario j and any of the other scenarios. We find that these estimated 
coefficients are generally statistically significant at usual confidence levels.3 The statistics 
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reported in the last column also indicate that variation between scenarios on average accounts 
for more than half of the total variation in the sample. All in all, it seems that understanding 
what drives a country towards any particular scenario is the key to explaining why 
development trajectories differ so much across countries.    
 
The data also has  interesting implication for the relationship between growth and changes in 
inequality. Political economy models often predict a trade-off between growth and 
redistribution, thus implying that a scenario of positive growth and decreasing inequality is 
difficult to achieve (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994). While 
the available empirical evidence on this trade off is ambiguous (see for instance Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2003), in our dataset growth and decreasing inequality do not appear to be mutually 
exclusive. As just mentioned, one third of total sample observations actually fall in scenario 
one and another one third fall in scenario two. Therefore, everything else being equal, a 
country going through a period of positive growth is equally likely to experience sharpening 
inequalities as it is to experience decreasing inequalities. Moreover, the average rate of 
growth in the two scenarios is quite similar, meaning that countries that reduce inequality are 
not necessarily penalised in terms of slower growth. In the appendix (section A3), we provide 
both parametric and non-parametric evidence confirming that there is no trade-off between 
growth and decreasing inequality in our data.  
  
4. Econometric results 
 
Our purpose in this section is to understand what affects a country’s probability to achieve 
any of the four scenarios identified in section 3. We go about this task by setting up a 
standard ordered probit model. We then design a relatively rich specification of regressors to 
represent an array of economic policies and structural factors. Finally, we submit our baseline 
results to various checks (some of which are described in more detail in the appendix). 
 
4.1. The model 
 
4.1.1. Econometric setting 
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For each generic observation i in the dataset, the dependent variable is coded as follows: si = 
0 if the observation falls in scenario one, si = 1 if the observation falls in scenario two, si = 2 
if the observation falls in scenario three, and si = 3 if the observation falls in scenario four. 
The econometric model therefore takes the form of a multinomial model.  
 
As well known, multinomial models vary according to whether the categories of the 
dependent variables are ordered or not. We have argued in sections 2 and 3 that our 
dependent variable involves inherently ordered outcomes, going from the most favourable 
scenario to the least favourable scenario for development. The probability of observation i 
falling in scenario j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) is then defined as: 
 
(1) β) β) 
 
where x is a vector of explanatory variables (i.e. the structural factors, initial conditions, and 
policy variables included in the dataset), 𝛷 denotes the standard normal c.d.f., and the µs and 
the β are parameters to be estimated.  
 
The intuition underlying the ordered probit model (1) is that “conduciveness to development” 
is a latent process defined by some interaction between ∆y (changes in per-capita income) 
and ∆g (changes in income inequality), which are in turn explained by the vector of variables 
x. While the latent process is not observed, the observed values of ∆y and ∆g allow 
identifying the four categories of the dependent variable si. In model (1), the stochastic 
component of the latent process is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. We also 
estimated a model using a logistic distribution and results were not qualitatively different. 
 
Model (1) is estimated by maximum likelihood. The sign of the regression parameters β can 
be interpreted in terms of the effect that explanatory variables have on the probabilities: a 
positive estimated coefficient on the generic variable xij means that an increase in xij 
decreases the probability of being in the lowest category and increases the probability of 
being in the highest category. 
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4.1.2. Choice and interpretation of explanatory variables 
 
The set of explanatory variables in model (1) includes country fixed effects, initial 
conditions, and policy variables (see appendix, section A5 for details on definitions and 
sources). Starting with the fixed effects, we control for British legal origin (legor_uk), 
distance from equator (lat_abst) and ethnic fragmentation (ethnix). These are time invariant 
effects that are likely to be important in determining the quality of governance and 
institutions. In turn good institutions should strengthen growth and reduce inequalities.4
 
 We 
therefore expect negative coefficients on both legor_uk and lat_abst and a positive coefficient 
on ethnix. Among the country fixed effects we also include a dummy for socialist legal 
origins (legor_so). Socialist countries in our sample are peculiar in two respects: (i) they were 
characterised for most of the sample period by extremely low inequality, reflecting the 
socialist or communist ideology, and (ii) most of them went through a prolonged period of 
negative growth and growing inequality in connection with the transition from plan to 
market. We thus expect legor_so to display a positive estimated coefficient in our model. 
The initial conditions we consider are the initial levels of per-capita income (i_y_pc) and Gini 
coefficient (i_gini). The large body of theoretical and empirical work on conditional 
convergence suggests that negative growth should be more likely at higher initial levels of 
per-capita income. The coefficient on i_y_pc should therefore be positive, even though it is 
not entirely clear how a higher initial income could affect the likelihood of reductions in 
inequality. An initially higher level of inequality makes the reduction of inequality more 
likely, as it is probably easier to lower a Gini coefficient of, say, 60 than a Gini coefficient of, 
say, 30. As already discussed, a higher Gini coefficient should not be an obstacle to growth, 
so that in the end i_gini is expected to have a negative coefficient. 
 
While time invariant effects and initial conditions are all measured in levels, the remaining 
controls are measured as annualised percentage changes. We include three indicators that are 
meant to capture the structural transformation of the economy. These are the rate of 
agricultural productivity growth (agr_prod), the change in the agriculture share of GDP 
(agr_va), and the change in the industry share of GDP (ind_va). In the literature, 
industrialization is often seen as the key to growth accelerations.5 A traditional Kuznets-type 
of argument then suggests that this transformation would be accompanied by an increase in 
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inequality, at least at the early stages of development. However, it is unclear to what extent a 
shift from agriculture to industry effectively leads to persistently higher inequality. In this 
respect, our expectation is that the growth effect of changes in sectoral shares is probably 
stronger than their distributional effect. The estimated coefficient on agr_va should hence be 
negative while the one on ind_va should be positive. At the same, the large weight that the 
agricultural sector maintains in many developing economies suggests that productivity 
growth in that sector is likely to impact significantly on the growth rate of the economy. To 
the extent that it reflects a transition from traditional to modern agriculture, a faster rate of 
productivity growth should also be associated with lower inequalities. Consequently, 
agr_prod is expected to display a negative coefficient.  
 
The increase in the density of telephone lines (t_comm) and the expansion of the proportion 
of irrigated land (irrigated) are meant to capture the dynamics of infrastructure development. 
Better infrastructures are expected to foster growth.6
 
 However, their contribution to the 
dynamics of inequality is ambiguous as it is likely to depend on their localisation on the 
territory. If governments decide to develop new infrastructures to satisfy the higher demand 
expressed by already economically more advanced areas, then the risk is that inequality in the 
country will increase. Avom and Carmignani (2008) provide evidence that this negative 
distributional effect might be statistically significant. Therefore, the coefficient on t_comm 
and irrigated is expected to be negative, but the prediction is somewhat ambiguous. 
Finally, the policy environment is represented by the growth rates of four variables: (i) credit 
to the private sector (credit), (ii) international trade (trade), (iii) government size (gov_cons), 
and (iv) investment in human capital (tyr). All of these variables are quite commonly used in 
the applied analysis of growth and inequality. The survey of results presented by Durlauf et 
al. (2005) suggest that credit, trade, and tyr should all promote growth, while there is no 
consensus on the sign of the effect of gov_cons . A wider access to credit should also help 
reduce inequalities. Similarly, an increase in human capital investment is usually regarded as 
an improvement in earning opportunities for the population at large, thus implying a 
potentially smoother distribution of income. A larger government should also contribute to 
reducing inequalities, to the extent that its size correlates with the extent of redistribution. On 
the contrary, results in Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Carmignani (2009) indicate that 
openness to trade can sharpen inequalities, even though the effect is not necessarily 
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statistically strong. Overall, there is no ambiguity about the expected sign of tyr and credit, 
which should be positive. On the other hand, for both gov_cons and trade a clear-cut 
prediction cannot be made.  
 
 
4.2. Results 
 
The estimated coefficients of model (1) are reported in table 2. We initially tested for the 
potential endogeneity of the regressors by running separate regressions of ∆ y and ∆g on the 
set of time-invariant effects and initial conditions plus each of the other variables.7
 
 We 
applied the Hausman endogeneity test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993), using lagged values 
of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. It turns out that credit, tyr, gov_cons, 
and trade are all endogenous to ∆ y and/or ∆g. We therefore use their lagged values in the 
estimation of the ordered probit model. 
SEE TABLE 2 (appendix) 
 
Column I provides our baseline results. All of the statistically significant coefficients are in 
line with our a priori expectations. Among the time-invariant effects, those that matter the 
most are geographical location and socialist legal origin. Initial conditions are statistically 
very important: a richer country with a lower initial Gini coefficient is less likely to achieve 
the most favourable scenario for development. The stage of structural transformation of the 
economy also matters: to be conducive to positive growth and declining inequalities, the 
transition from agriculture to industry must be accompanied by the modernisation of the 
agricultural system and hence by the acceleration of agricultural productivity growth. Finally, 
the development of telecommunication infrastructures and the increase in the education level 
of the population are also conducive to the achievement of a scenario of positive growth and 
declining inequality.8
 
   
In column II we drop the variable tyr, which is not available for all countries in the sample, in 
order to maximise the number of observations for estimation. The only noteworthy change 
concerns the variable legor_so, which now becomes statistically insignificant. In fact, 
education data for socialist countries are not widely available. The regression with tyr 
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therefore includes few observations on socialist legal origins and these few observations are 
concentrated in the period that corresponds to the transitional recession. The recovery of 
several socialist countries, with positive growth and lowering inequalities, towards the end of 
the 1990s and the early 2000s is therefore not captured by the estimates in column I. 
However, it is captured by the estimates in column II. The fact that in column II the 
coefficient of legor_so is not significant can therefore be interpreted of evidence that, outside 
the period of the transitional recession, being of a socialist origin does not necessarily push 
countries towards an unfavourable development scenario. 
 
In column III we make use of a three-category definition of the dependent variable. The 
evidence discussed in section 3 indicates that (i) scenarios are clearly ordered and (ii) 
differences between scenarios are statistically significant. Nevertheless, for a couple of 
development indicators, the difference between scenarios two and three might not be strong 
(see also footnote 3). Therefore, we test the robustness of our results by estimating a model 
where the dependent variable has only three categories: 0 for scenario one, 1 for scenarios 
two and three, and 2 for scenario four. The results do not dramatically differ from those 
reported in column I. However, we do notice that the coefficient on t_comm is now less 
precisely estimated. When dropping the variable tyr (estimates available from the authors 
upon request) t_comm returns to be statistically significant, while legor_so becomes non-
significant. All in all, we believe that the core of our results holds true whether four or three 
categories are defined for the dependent variable. As a further sensitivity check, in the 
appendix (section A4) we also report evidence from a multinomial logit model with 
unordered outcomes. 
 
In column IV we estimate the effect of each variable separately on the probability of 
achieving (i) positive growth and (ii) lower inequality. The underlying setting is a bivariate 
probit model. In practice, we estimate two probit equations: in the first one, the dependent 
variable takes value one if the gini indicator decreases (gini_down); in the second equation, 
the dependent variable takes value one if growth is positive (y_pc_up). However, we do allow 
for correlated disturbances across the two probit equations, much in the same spirit as the 
seemingly unrelated regression model for continuous variables. A positive estimated 
coefficient now indicates that the regressor increases the probability of reducing inequality or 
achieving positive growth.  
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The estimates in column IV are useful to understand whether a particular variable plays its 
role mainly through the distributional effect (e.g. the effect on the change in inequality) or the 
growth effect (e.g. the effect on the change in per-capita income). Interestingly, a few 
variables appear to activate both effects. This is the case for agricultural productivity growth 
and telecommunication infrastructures. However, while agr_prod increases both the 
probability of reducing Gini and the probability of positive growth, t_comm generates effects 
of opposite sign. In particular, t_comm increases the probability of ∆ y > 0, but it also reduces 
the probability of ∆ g < 0. The estimates reported in columns I and II suggest that in the end 
the growth effect dominates, so that t_comm positively contributes to the achievement of a 
scenario of growth and decreasing inequality. Of the other variables that are significant in the 
aggregate models, most tend to affect the probability of positive growth more than the 
probability of lowering inequality. It is however important to stress that, with the exception of 
t_comm, none of the variables that promotes a positive growth also increases the likelihood of 
higher inequalities. Similarly, none of the variables that increase the probability of gini_down 
also decrease the probability of positive growth. Taken together, these findings mean that 
growth and decreasing inequality are not mutually exclusive, as long as the appropriate set of 
policies and conditions is in place.  
 
Finally, we estimate a simplified specification of the benchmark model that only includes the 
statistically significant variables. We perform this exercise both excluding tyr (column V) 
and including tyr (column VI) among the regressors. All of the variables retain their sign and 
level of statistical significance, thus suggesting that the estimates are not determined by 
spurious correlations arising from the inclusion of irrelevant regressors. Note that the results 
on legor_so are consistent with the findings from the benchmark specification in column I. 
As an additional robustness test (not reported in the table, but available upon request), we 
take each of the non-significant variables from column I (or II) and add it, one at a time, to 
the simplified specification of column V (or VI). None of these other variables turns out to be 
significant. At the same time, the estimated coefficients of the variables of the simplified 
specification remain very similar to those reported in the table.  
 
 
    
14 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we are concerned with the contribution of economic policies to the creation of 
conditions that are most conducive to development. Our point of departure is the observation 
that the dynamics of several development indicators can be clustered in four groups and that 
each group corresponds to a specific combination of growth and changes in inequality. We 
can then identify four scenarios that are ordered from most conducive to least conducive to 
development. We use an ordered probit model to study how policies and structural factors 
affect a country’s probability of achieving the most (or least) favourable scenario. This 
approach presents a couple of advantages. First, we are able study the determinants of broad 
development rather than focusing on a single specific dimension or indicator. Equally 
important is the fact that we can do this without having to come up with some arbitrary 
procedure to aggregate individual development indicators into a single measure. Second, with 
the ordered probit model we avoid some of the pitfalls that arise when using growth and 
inequality as continuous dependent variables in single or system equation estimation. These 
advantages come at no real cost in terms of loss of information as the categorical dependent 
variable in our model is a very strong predictor of development outcomes, possibly even 
stronger than the continuous variables growth and inequality.  
 
The results point to a comforting picture: good policies help create favourable conditions for 
development. In this sense, countries are not condemned to be underdeveloped by initial 
conditions, geography, or historical legacies. By implementing the appropriate set of policies, 
a country can achieve the scenario of positive growth with declining inequality that provides 
the most favourable conditions for sustained development. In this respect, policies promoting 
the accumulation of human capital and the development of infrastructures appear to be 
particularly beneficial. Supporting the structural transformation of the economy and the 
expansion of the industrial sector is also going to play an important role. However, our 
findings indicate that while promoting structural transformation, governments should avoid 
treating agriculture as a “neglected sector”. In fact, structural transformation should be 
accompanied by a process of modernisation of the agricultural system to increase agricultural 
productivity.  
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Table 1.  Characterisation of poverty reduction scenarios 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 
 
 
      
Poverty headcount -7.57 
(2.25) 
-2.25 
(2.27) 
-1.05 
(4.47) 
16.96 
(3.65) 
 
0.53 
Life expectancy 
 
0.43 
(0.10) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
-0.29 
(0.15) 
-0.41 
(0.23) 
 
0.58 
Immunisation DPT 3.85 
(1.03) 
2.26 
(1.02) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
-3.13 
(1.11) 
 
0.64 
Female literacy 3.17 
(1.31) 
1.89 
(0.14) 
1.01 
(1.12) 
-1.15 
(0.28) 
 
0.49 
Malnutrition -2.11 
(0.88) 
-1.21 
(0.45) 
-0.71 
(1.05) 
0.27 
(0.31) 
 
0.61 
Child mortality -4.42 
(0.35) 
-2.75 
(0.81) 
-1.04 
(0.33) 
0.98 
(0.41) 
 
0.47 
Per-capita income 2.63 
(0.30) 
2.78 
(0.31) 
-1.61 
(0.58) 
-3.73 
(0.49) 
 
0.58 
Gini 
 
-1.66 
(0.25) 
1.69 
(0.25) 
 
-2.27 
(0.48) 
3.76 
(0.40) 
0.71 
Notes: All the variables are expressed in annualized percentage changes. The number in brackets are the 
standard deviations of the estimated α from the following OLS regression: 
 , where x is the percentage change in a generic development indicator, 
i is a generic country and t a generic sub-period, Sj is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the observation  falls in 
scenario j (where j = 1, 2, 3, 4), and ε is a disturbance.  
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Table 2: Regression results 
 I II III IV V VI 
    Gini_down Y_pc_up   
Legor_uk 
 
0.092 -0.158 -0.120 0.719* -0.637 .. .. 
Legor_so 
 
2.719*** 0.008 2.319** -0.130 -5.284*** 2.172*** 0.413 
Lat_abst 
 
-3.311** -2.868** -3.578** 2.58 4.272** -2.944** -2.636*** 
Ethnic 
 
-0.548 -0.409 -0.718 1.024 0.0138 .. .. 
I_yp_c 
 
0.729*** 0.397*** 0.691*** -0.188 -1.659*** 0.623*** 0.402*** 
I_gini 
 
-1.195* -2.428*** -1.701** 2.080** 0.244 -1.624** -2.204*** 
Agr_prod 
 
-0.212*** -.177*** -0.215*** 0.134** 0.255*** -0.198*** -0.171*** 
Agr_va 
 
0.121*** 0.108*** 0.109** -0.018 -0.196*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 
Ind_va 
 
-0.051 -0.019 -0.052 -0.013 0.142 .. .. 
T_comm 
 
-0.061** -0.051** -0.035 -0.050** 0.234*** -0.0561** -0.053*** 
Irrigated 
 
-0.035 -0.048 -0.056   0.107** -0.007 .. .. 
Credit 
 
-0.216 0.008 -0.324 0.415* 0.081 .. .. 
Trade 
 
0.202 0.022 0.182 -0.071 -0.879 .. .. 
Govcons 
 
-0.529 -0.261 -0.537 0.656 0.943 .. .. 
Tyr 
 
-1.005*** .. -0.921** 0.071 2.681*** -0.607** .. 
        
Obs. 89 122 89 90 93 134 
Notes:  Models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are estimated using an ordered probit. Model 4 is estimated by bivariate probit. 
To account for possible reverse causality, credit, govcons, trade, and tyr are all lagged. See the appendix for 
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variables definition. *, **, *** indicate that estimated coefficients are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence level respectively. 
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Endnotes 
 
 The empirical estimation of the determinants of specific health indicators is obviously a main 
area of interest in medical science. See for instance Houweling et al. (2005) and Blouin et al. 
(2009) for two recent contributions of interest to development economists. 
 
2 The short time series dimension of our panel is due to (i) the limited availability of many 
development indicators on a time series basis and (ii) the requirement that percentage 
changes be computed over periods of at least five years. The Appendix provides a full 
description of sources and details on the construction of the dataset. 
 
3 There are few notable exceptions. Thus, with respect to the poverty headcount and 
malnutrition the difference between scenario two and scenario three is not significant. With 
respect to female literacy the difference between scenario three and scenario four is not 
significant. All of the estimated coefficients are available from the authors upon request. 
 
4The determinants of institutional quality are analysed by La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Acemoglu (2008, chapter 22) provide a survey of the 
voluminous research on the relationship between institutions and growth. Finally, the effect 
of institutions on income inequality is investigated, inter alia, in Carmignani (2009). 
  
5 See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (2009, chapter 10). 
 
6 Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), among others, discuss the positive contribution of 
infrastructures to growth. 
 
7 Time invariant effects and initial conditions are pre-determined and therefore treated as 
exogenous. In the end, we test for the endogeneity of t_comm, irrigated, credit, trade, tyr, 
and gov_cons. 
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8 The estimated threshold parameters µ for the mode in column I are: µ1 = -4.43 (-9.76, 0.89), 
µ2 = -2.94 (-8.25, 2.36), µ3 = -2.14 (-7.46, 3.16). Estimates for the other models are 
qualitatively similar and can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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